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THE ANTI-ZOMBIE ARGUMENT ∗ 
KEITH FRANKISH 
 
 
Kline had mentioned several reports suggesting that a chemical antidote was 
administered to the zombi victim in the graveyard at the time of his 
resurrection.... When I asked [Marcel] if he would be able to prepare it for us, 
he looked momentarily bewildered. Naturally, he replied, one would never 
make the poison without making the antidote.  
(W. Davis, The Serpent and the Rainbow, New York: Warner, 1987, p. 111)  
 
In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the 
case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the 
powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek 
to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, 
an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I 
shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers 
no independent reason to reject physicalism.  
 
I. ZOMBIES AND ANTI-ZOMBIES  
I begin with a reminder of the zombie argument. The argument is often set out 
using the framework of two-dimensional semantics, but I shall present it in a 
simpler version here; nothing will turn on the complications omitted.  
 In broad terms, physicalism about consciousness is the view that 
phenomenal properties are not extra features of the world distinct from those 
that could be catalogued by a completed basic physics (the microphysical 
features).2 There are many ways of spelling out this broad characterization, but 
in all of them it follows that consciousness supervenes metaphysically on the 
                                                 
∗ This is an e-print of an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (229) 2007, pp. 651-
666. It may differ in minor ways from the print version. The definitive version is available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997329/issue.  
1 D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford UP, 1996); 'Materialism and the 
Metaphysics of Modality', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999), pp. 473-96; 'Consciousness and its Place in 
Nature', in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 247-72; 
'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?', in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford 
UP, 2002), pp. 145-200; 'Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument', in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa and D. 
Stoljar (eds), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (MIT 
Press, 2004), pp. 269-98; 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', in his The Character of Consciousness 
(Oxford UP, forthcoming; pre-publication version available at http://consc.net/papers/2dargument.html). 
2  I assume that a completed basic physics will deal in micro-level laws and entities, but nothing hangs on this 
assumption. If it should prove false, we might speak instead of the basic physical features.  
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microphysical: any world that has the same microphysical laws as ours and the 
same distribution of microphysical properties will have the same distribution of 
phenomenal properties too. (This is not, of course, to say that those 
microphysical features are necessary for consciousness: a physicalist in the 
present sense can allow that there are worlds where consciousness is non- 
physically realized.) I shall assume that the converse entailment also holds: that 
if consciousness supervenes metaphysically on the microphysical, then 
physicalism is true. This is a widespread assumption on both sides of the 
debate, and in the present context in particular it is unlikely to be challenged. 
The only view admitting metaphysical supervenience without physicalism is 
one which posits metaphysically necessary bridging laws linking microphysical 
properties with distinct phenomenal ones, and this is not a view which 
defenders of the zombie argument can consistently endorse. (To hold that the 
laws of nature are metaphysically necessary is, in effect, to deny that whatever 
is clearly conceivable is metaphysically possible, which is a key premise of the 
zombie argument.) Thus, if we use the term 'physical' for properties that are 
either microphysical or metaphysically supervenient on  the  microphysical,  
then  physicalism  about  consciousness  can  be conveniently  expressed  as  
the  view  that  consciousness  is  a  physical phenomenon.  
 Dualism, in contrast, is the view that consciousness is not a physical 
phenomenon — phenomenal properties are extra features of the world, over 
and above the microphysical ones, so consciousness does not supervene 
metaphysically on the microphysical.  
 I shall call an object x a physical duplicate of an object y if x is a duplicate of y 
in all microphysical respects, and hence in all physical ones. Then zombies are 
beings which are physical duplicates of us, inhabiting a world which is a 
physical duplicate of ours, but lacking consciousness. That is, zombies share all 
of our physical properties, but are not conscious.3 The zombie argument for 
dualism is this:  
 
1. Zombies are conceivable  
2. If zombies are conceivable, then zombies are metaphysically possible  
3. If zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is non-physical  
4. So consciousness is non-physical.4  
 
The sort of conceivability involved here is, in Chalmers' terms (see 'Does 
Conceivability Entail Possibility?'), ideal and primary. A state of affairs is ideally 
conceivable if its conceivability cannot be defeated by better reasoning. A state 
                                                 
3  See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 94-5. 
4  See, e.g., Chalmers, 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', p. 249. 
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of affairs is primarily conceivable if for all we know a priori it might actually 
obtain. Primary conceivability is thus an a priori matter, constrained only by 
logic and the meanings of the terms involved. (In contrast, a state of affairs is 
secondarily conceivable if it conceivably might have obtained, given how the 
world actually is.)  
 The zombie argument has a good claim to soundness. Premise (1) is 
plausible. As Chalmers puts it (The Conscious Mind, p. 96), his zombie twin is 
'just something physically identical to me, but which has no conscious 
experience — all is dark inside', and this description seems coherent. (It may 
be objected that the claim that zombies are conceivable begs the question 
against interactionist forms of dualism: we can imagine subtracting 
consciousness while leaving the physical world unchanged only if we assume 
that consciousness does not affect the physical world. I shall address this point 
later.)  
 Premise (2) is an instance of what I shall refer to as the CP thesis, the thesis 
that if a situation is ideally conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. 
(Henceforth I shall write simply of possibility; the variety in question will 
always be the metaphysical one.) The CP thesis is controversial, but a strong 
case can be made for it. The most important objection to the thesis arises from 
a posteriori necessities. Water is necessarily H2O, but this is not knowable a 
priori, and it is primarily conceivable that water is something else. It is arguable, 
however, that primary conceivability always corresponds to some genuine 
possibility, reflecting the primary intensions of the concepts involved. (The 
primary intension of a concept specifies what the concept refers to in the 
actual world, or in any world considered as actual. It can roughly be thought of 
as a description of the characteristic features by which we identify the 
concept's referent.) Thus the primary conceivability of water's not being H2O 
corresponds to the genuine possibility that a substance with the identifying 
features of water (liquid, colourless, odourless, drinkable, etc.) is not H2O. We 
are misled only if we wrongly describe this as the possibility that water is not 
H2O. Moreover, it is arguable that in the case of consciousness we cannot be 
misled in this way, since anything that possesses the identifying features of 
consciousness is consciousness — or at any rate something just as problematic 
as consciousness.5  
 Premise (3) is uncontroversial. If it is possible for a creature to possess all 
our physical properties without possessing our phenomenal properties, then 
the latter are not among the former.  
                                                 
5  For detailed discussion and defence of the CP thesis, see Chalmers, 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?'. 
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 Physicalist responses to the zombie argument usually attack one or other of 
premises (1) and (2), the more radical physicalists denying (1), the more 
conservative ones accepting (1) but denying (2). Chalmers dubs the former 
'type-A' materialists, the latter 'type-B'.6  
 I shall adopt a different approach, showing that we can construct an exactly 
parallel argument for physicalism. I begin by introducing the notion of an anti-
zombie. I shall call an object x a bare physical duplicate of an object y if x is a 
physical duplicate of y and has no further properties of a non-physical kind. 
Then we can define anti-zombies as beings which are bare physical duplicates 
of us, inhabiting a universe which is a bare physical duplicate of ours, but none 
the less having exactly the same conscious experiences as we do. That is, in the 
anti-zombie world consciousness is a physical phenomenon, supervening 
metaphysically on the world's microphysical features — in virtue of token 
identities, say. (It is worth stressing that the anti-zombie world is one in which 
consciousness is metaphysically, not merely nomologically, supervenient on the 
microphysical. If the microphysical features were only causally sufficient for 
the phenomenal ones, consciousness would not be a physical phenomenon in 
the present sense.) Of course, if physicalists are right, then we are anti-zombies, 
but to a dualist the notion of an anti-zombie will presumably seem as 
outlandish as that of a zombie does to a physicalist.  
 The anti-zombie argument for physicalism is this (the notion of 
conceivability involved is the same as in the zombie argument, and 'possible' 
means metaphysically possible):  
 
5. Anti-zombies are conceivable  
6. If anti-zombies are conceivable, then anti-zombies are possible  
7. If anti-zombies are possible, then consciousness is physical  
8. So consciousness is physical.  
 
Again the argument has a strong claim to soundness. Premise (5) is plausible. 
My anti-zombie twin is just something which is physically identical with me, 
and has no non-physical properties, but which has conscious experience — the 
lights are on inside. The description seems as coherent as that of a zombie. (As 
with the parallel claim about zombies, there is an assumption here that 
                                                 
6  For type-A positions, see, e.g., D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge, 1968); D.C. 
Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991); R. Kirk, Zombies  and  Consciousness  (Oxford  UP,  2005);  
D.  Lewis,  'What  Experience  Teaches',  in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519. 
For type-B positions, see, e.g., P. Carruthers, Phenomenal Consciousness: a Naturalistic Theory (Cambridge UP, 2000); C.S. 
Hill, 'Imaginability, Conceivability and the Mind-Body Problem', Philosophical Studies, 87 (1997), pp. 61-85; J. Levine, 
Purple Haze: the Puzzle of Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2001); B. Loar, 'Phenomenal States', in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and 
G. Güzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 597-616; W.G. Lycan, 
Consciousness and Experience (MIT Press, 1996); D. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2002). 
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consciousness has no physical effects; I shall discuss this shortly.) It might be 
objected that there is an asymmetry between (1) and (5), in that the latter 
requires us to embed a totality-clause ('no further properties of a non-physical 
kind') under the conceivability-operator, whereas the former does not. 
However, it is not clear that this makes (5) less plausible, and both premises are 
on a par to the extent that they both require us to conceive of the absence of 
something — phenomenal properties in one case, non-physical properties in 
the other.  
 The other premises are also plausible. The case for accepting (6) is the 
same as that for accepting (2), namely, that it is an application of the CP thesis. 
Premise (7) requires explanation, but, like (3), should be uncontroversial. In the 
anti-zombie world consciousness is physical, so the microphysical features of 
that world (the laws and distribution of properties) are metaphysically 
sufficient for consciousness, and any world with the same microphysical 
features will have the same distribution of phenomenal properties. But by 
definition our world has the same microphysical features as the anti-zombie 
one. Hence the microphysical features of our world are metaphysically 
sufficient for the existence of consciousness. So the following is true:  
 
9. If anti-zombies are possible, then the microphysical features of our world 
are metaphysically sufficient for the existence of consciousness.  
 
Given the assumption that metaphysical supervenience entails physicalism, this 
is equivalent to (7). It might be objected that all this shows is that we have a 
physical form of consciousness: it does not rule out the possibility that we have 
a non-physical form as well. Perhaps we possess two otherwise identical sets of 
phenomenal properties, one physical in character, the other non-physical. This 
worry can be dismissed, however. Even if the suggestion is coherent (and it is 
not clear that it is), there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it is true, and 
considerations of simplicity tell overwhelmingly against it.  
 This, then, is the anti-zombie argument. It may seem strange to claim that 
the mere conceivability of physicalism entails its truth, but the general strategy 
is the same as that employed in the zombie argument. In each case the CP 
thesis is used to move from a psychological claim to a metaphysical one. In the 
zombie case we imagine subtracting our consciousness while leaving our 
physical features intact, and conclude that consciousness is non-physical. In the 
anti-zombie case we imagine subtracting our (putative) non-physical features 
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while leaving our consciousness intact, and conclude that consciousness is 
physical. If the strategy is sound in the one case, then it is sound in the other.7 
 
II. COMMENTS AND AN OBJECTION  
I shall say more in defence of the anti-zombie argument shortly. Before doing 
so, however, I shall add some points of clarification and comparison, and 
address a possible objection.  
 First, the conclusion of the anti-zombie argument is that consciousness is 
actually physical, not that it is necessarily physical. If sound, the argument 
establishes that the microphysical features of our world are metaphysically 
sufficient for consciousness, and thus that consciousness is physical in our 
world. It does not show that those features are metaphysically necessary for 
consciousness, and therefore does not rule out functionalist versions of 
physicalism, according to which consciousness is in fact microphysically 
realized but could have been realized in other ways.  
 Secondly, the effect of the argument is to put pressure on the CP thesis. 
The zombie and anti-zombie arguments cannot both be sound, so if both 
zombies and anti-zombies are conceivable, then (assuming (3) and (7) are 
accepted) conceivability does not entail possibility. The argument is similar to 
one advanced by Stephen Yablo, which turns on the conceivability of a 
necessarily existing god.8 It seems that we can conceive both of the existence 
of such a being and of its non-existence. But these conceptions cannot both 
correspond with genuine possibilities, since a necessarily existing being exists in 
all worlds if it exists in any. Again the CP thesis comes under pressure.  
 Thirdly, the anti-zombie argument should be distinguished from a 
metamodal argument for physicalism, outlined by Chalmers (who does not, of 
course, endorse it). Let p be the conjunction of all microphysical truths about 
the world and q an arbitrary phenomenal truth. Then  
 
11. It is conceivable that p ⊃ q is necessary  
12. If it is conceivable that p ⊃ q is necessary, then it is possible that p ⊃ q is 
necessary [CP thesis]  
13. If it is possible that p ⊃ q is necessary, then p ⊃ q is necessary [S5 principle 
MLp ⊃ Lp]  
                                                 
7  The idea that the zombists' weapons can be turned against themselves is not new, and both Peter Marton and 
Scott Sturgeon have employed versions of the strategy: see P. Marton, 'Zombies versus Materialists: the Battle for 
Conceivability', Southwest Philosophy Review, 14 (1998), pp. 131-8; S. Sturgeon, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and 
Nature (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 115-16. However, their arguments, unlike the present one, take a metamodal 
form.  
8  S. Yablo, 'Concepts and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999), pp. 455-63.  
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14. If p ⊃ q is necessary, then consciousness is physical  
15. So consciousness is physical.9  
 
(A parallel argument for dualism can be obtained by substituting 'not necessary' 
for 'necessary' and 'non-physical' for 'physical' throughout.) Closely related 
metamodal arguments have also been outlined by Peter Marton and Scott 
Sturgeon.10  
 Crucially, this argument differs from the anti-zombie argument in that it 
involves conceiving of the truth of a modal claim about the space of possible 
worlds. This feature may be a serious weakness, for it is arguable that the CP 
thesis applies only to non-modal claims about the distribution of properties 
within worlds; indeed, since the space of possible worlds is unique, conceiving 
of different spaces is tantamount to conceiving of the falsity of the CP thesis, 
as Chalmers points out.11 The anti-zombie argument, in contrast, does not 
suffer from this weakness. To conceive of anti-zombies, we simply have to 
imagine a world where the relation between a being's phenomenal properties 
and its underlying microphysical ones is such that the former are not further 
properties over and above the latter — for example, where the relation is one 
of token identity. If it is possible for such a relation to hold, then a modal 
claim follows, as spelt out in (9), but the claim need not form part of the 
original conception. Physicalism entails a modal thesis, but need not be 
conceived as one.  
 Fourthly, the anti-zombie argument lacks a certain weakness possessed by 
its opposite number. The problem is that it is arguable that microphysical 
concepts pick out their referents by their causal roles, rather than by their 
intrinsic natures. If so, then in conceiving of a microphysical duplicate of our 
world, we shall be conceiving merely of a structural duplicate — a world with 
functionally identical microphysical properties, distributed in the same way. 
And the primary conceivability of such a world can show only that 
consciousness does not supervene on the microphysical structure of our world. 
It leaves open the possibility that there is an a posteriori necessity linking  
consciousness  with  the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  microphysical properties 
involved — a view which is a form of Russellian monism rather than  
dualism.12 No  corresponding  loophole  exists  in  the  anti-zombie argument. 
Assuming that the CP thesis is sound, the primary conceivability of an anti-
                                                 
9  Adapted from Chalmers, 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', online pre-publication version, 
§8. 
10  Marton, 'Zombies versus Materialists: the Battle for Conceivability'; Sturgeon, Matters of Mind, pp. 115-16.  
11  See  Chalmers,  'Materialism  and  the  Metaphysics  of  Modality'  and  'The  Two- Dimensional Argument 
Against Materialism'. 
12  See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 134-6, and 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', pp. 256-7, 265-7. 
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zombie world establishes that it is possible for consciousness to supervene 
metaphysically on the microphysical structure of our world, which in turn 
establishes that this structure is metaphysically sufficient for consciousness, 
whatever the intrinsic nature of the microphysical properties involved.  
 With these points made, I turn to an objection. This is that the anti-zombie 
argument begs the question against interactionist dualism.13 The thought is that 
we can conceive of a (temporally extended) bare physical duplicate of the 
actual world only if we assume that the actual world is physically closed under 
causation. For if some physical events in the actual world are partially 
determined by facts about a non-physical consciousness, then it is obvious that 
in a purely physical world with the same microphysical laws and the same 
initial distribution of microphysical properties, events would unfold 
differently.14 At first sight, it might seem that this objection is innocuous, since 
a very similar one applies to the zombie argument, which also requires us to 
conceive of a physically identical world without consciousness. Both arguments 
assume that interactionist dualism is false. This is not the end of the matter, 
however. Begging the question against interactionist dualism is, arguably, a 
more serious sin for an anti-dualist argument than for a pro-dualist one. 
Moreover, the zombie argument can be modified so that it does not beg this 
question, giving an argument which interactionist dualists could endorse. A 
world superficially like ours and with the same distribution of phenomenal 
properties, but physically closed under causation (any causal gaps being filled 
by physical substitutes for what are actually non-physical processes), I shall call 
wpc (for physically closed). This world wpc might still contain non-physical 
properties, provided they are epiphenomenal. Beings that are physical 
duplicates of the inhabitants of wpc but are not conscious are zombiespc. The 
interactionist dualist can run a modified zombie argument to the conclusion 
that consciousness is non-physical in wpc. (Zombiespc are conceivable and 
therefore possible, so the microphysical features of wpc are not metaphysically 
sufficient for consciousness.) Since physicalists will say that wpc is the actual 
world, it follows that physicalism about consciousness is false.  
 Similarly, however, anti-zombiespc can be defined as beings that are bare 
physical duplicates of the inhabitants of wpc but none the less have exactly the 
same conscious experiences as they do. Then a modified anti-zombie argument 
can support the conclusion that consciousness is physical in wpc. (Anti-
zombiespc are conceivable and therefore possible, so the microphysical features 
                                                 
13  I am grateful to Bob Kirk for pressing me to address this objection, and for suggesting the modified version of 
the zombie argument discussed below. 
14  See J. Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 72-7. 
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of wpc are metaphysically sufficient for consciousness.) This does not entail that 
physicalism is true, of course; to reach that conclusion would need the 
additional premise that the actual world is physically closed under causation. 
However, it does cancel out whatever reason the modified version of the 
zombie argument provides for thinking that physicalism is false, and 
interactionist dualists must either refute it or cease to employ that argument.  
 In what follows I shall focus on the original versions of the two arguments. 
Since those versions assume that the actual world is physically closed under 
causation, there is no difference between zombies and zombiespc or between 
anti-zombies and anti-zombiespc, and the central conceivability issues are the 
same in both cases.  
 
III. THE MORAL FOR ZOMBISTS  
How should advocates of the zombie argument ('zombists') respond to the 
anti-zombie argument? Since they endorse the CP thesis, they must accept (6), 
and as I have shown, (7) is uncontroversial. Their only option, then, is to deny 
(5), that anti-zombies are conceivable. The same conclusion can be reached by 
a different route. Zombists maintain that zombies are possible. But the 
possibility of zombies is incompatible with that of anti-zombies. For if there is 
an anti-zombie world, then its microphysical features are metaphysically 
sufficient for consciousness. Hence there is no world with the same 
microphysical features but without consciousness, that is, no zombie world. 
Another way of making the point is that the unique possible world which is a 
bare physical duplicate of the actual world (wbp for bare physical; this will be the 
actual world itself, if the actual world has no non-physical features) ought to be 
a zombie world, if any is. But wbp is also the only candidate for an anti-zombie 
world. In effect, then, the proponents of the two arguments disagree as to 
whether the inhabitants of wbp are conscious. If they are not, then wbp is 
properly described as a zombie world, and zombies are possible; if they are, 
then wbp is properly described as an anti-zombie world, and anti-zombies are 
possible. But of course the two sides cannot both be right. Either the 
inhabitants of wbp are conscious or they are not. Thus the possibility of 
zombies is incompatible with that of anti-zombies. And if conceivability entails 
possibility, then it follows that the conceivability of zombies is incompatible 
with that of anti-zombies.  
 In short, physicalists have been giving zombists too easy a ride. It seemed 
that if the CP thesis were sound, all zombists had to do was to show that there 
is no incoherence in the notion of a zombie. But in fact they also have to show 
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that there is an incoherence in the notion of an anti-zombie. This involves a 
significant shift of the burden of proof. As Chalmers himself explains:  
 
In general, a certain burden of proof lies on those who claim that a given 
description is logically impossible.... If no reasonable analysis of the terms in 
question points towards a contradiction, or even makes the existence of a 
contradiction plausible, then there is a natural assumption in favour of logical 
possibility.15 
 
I shall now argue that zombists cannot shoulder this burden, and thus that the 
zombie argument fails. I shall begin by making the case for the conceivability 
of anti-zombies, and then deal with some possible counter-arguments. Most of 
the issues are familiar from the literature, but the present context will cast them 
in a different light.16 
 
IV. CONCEIVING OF ANTI-ZOMBIES  
As Chalmers notes in 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?', conceivability 
can be either negative or positive. A state of affairs is negatively conceivable if the 
hypothesis that it obtains cannot be ruled out a priori, i.e., if there is no 
contradiction latent in it. A state of affairs is positively conceivable if we can 
imagine a scenario in which the state of affairs holds, and we can flesh out this 
scenario to an arbitrary degree of detail. Prima facie, anti-zombies are 
conceivable in both senses. To claim that anti-zombies are negatively 
conceivable is, in effect, to claim that for all we know a priori, the phenomenal 
properties of experience might be physical ones, whether neurological or 
functional. This claim involves no obvious contradiction. As Locke observed, 
we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that God might, if he pleased, give 
systems of matter the power to perceive and think.17 
 It might be suggested that on analysis, the concept of a phenomenal 
property turns out to be that of a non-physical property (an essentially 
subjective one, say), so that it is a priori that phenomenal concepts do not apply 
to anything in the anti-zombie world. This is not persuasive, however. We may 
have a concept like this (the traditional philosophical concept of qualia, 
                                                 
15  Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, p. 96. By 'logically impossible' he means 'inconceivable': see 'Materialism and the 
Metaphysics of Modality', p. 477.  
16  Peter Marton has also argued in his 'Zombies versus Materialists' that the CP thesis can be used to shift the 
burden of proof onto the zombist. He points out that if physicalism is treated as a supervenience thesis, then if it is 
false, it is necessarily false, and hence impossible. But given the CP thesis, if a state of affairs is impossible, then it is 
inconceivable. Since zombists reject physicalism and endorse the CP thesis, they must therefore show that physicalism 
is inconceivable.  
17  Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 5th edn (London: Dent, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 146-7. 
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perhaps), but physicalists simply deny that consciousness is to be characterized 
in terms of it. Instead, they define phenomenal properties in a more neutral 
way, as those properties we refer to when we talk of what our experiences are 
like, and on which we focus when we introspect our experiences. This 
definition does not preclude physicality.  
 Nor is it obviously impossible to form a positive conception of how 
consciousness could be physical. At its simplest, imagining an anti-zombie 
involves conjoining the ideas of a bare physical duplicate and consciousness, 
and on the face of it this is no harder than disjoining them in the case of 
zombies. It is true that there is some imaginative resistance to the idea that 
consciousness might be physical. 'How could this', people sometimes ask, 
mentally  indicating  some  experience,  'be  just  a  neurological  state?'. 
Difficulty is irrelevant here, however. Conceivability is all or nothing, and one 
state of affairs may be harder to imagine than another without being less 
conceivable. (It is, for example, much harder to imagine Ronald Reagan and 
Freddie Mercury being the same person than to imagine their being distinct, 
but the two scenarios are on a par with respect to primary conceivability.) 
Moreover, reluctance to think of consciousness as physical can be explained 
away by reference to the features of phenomenal concepts. It is generally 
agreed that these are not physical concepts (that is, they do not represent their 
objects as physical), and that their cognitive role is very different from that of 
physical concepts (unlike physical concepts, they are deployed in introspection, 
tend to trigger sensory images, and can be acquired only by those who have 
had appropriate sensory experiences). And this may suggest that the properties 
they pick out cannot be physical. But that, of course, would be a fallacy. It 
remains open that phenomenal concepts pick out neurological or functional 
states of some kind.  
 Of course, this needs supplementing with some account of how 
phenomenal concepts could refer to physical properties, but it is not clear that 
this cannot be done. We need to imagine a creature subjectively just like us and 
with exactly the same physical structure as ours, but whose phenomenal 
concepts refer to physical features of its experiences. Exactly what would be 
required for this depends on the nature of phenomenal concepts and the 
means by which their reference is determined — things which are matters of 
considerable dispute. But I can at least sketch a plausible picture. It is widely 
agreed that phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, rather than 
by way of other properties contingently associated with them.18 And I can flesh 
                                                 
18  See, e.g., Chalmers, 'The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief', in Q. Smith and  A.  Jokic  (eds),  
Consciousness:  New  Philosophical  Perspectives  (Oxford  UP,  2003),  pp.  220-72; Loar,  'Phenomenal  States';  Papineau,  
Thinking  about  Consciousness;  Perry,  Knowledge,  Possibility, and  Consciousness;  M.  Tye,  Consciousness,  Color,  and  Content  
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out this view by combining it either with a causal theory of reference, 
according to which phenomenal concept c refers to phenomenal property P if 
there is the right sort of causal dependency between tokenings of c and 
occurrences of P, or with a causal-historical theory, according to which c refers 
to P if c-tokening has been selected to serve as an indicator of P. Such accounts 
are compatible with physicalism — indeed, they are incompatible with 
anything other than physicalism if the physical world is causally closed. Of 
course, at present we do not know whether the postulated causal dependencies 
or selectional histories actually obtain, and so  cannot  be  sure  that  the  
corresponding  conceptions  are  coherent. (Empirical information is relevant 
here, even though we are concerned with primary conceivability, since the 
question is whether it is conceivable that our actual physical properties should be 
sufficient for consciousness, and to answer this question we need to know 
what our actual physical properties are.) But equally we do not know that the 
conceptions, or variants of them, are not coherent, so there is no argument here 
for denying the conceivability of anti-zombies.  
 
V. ZOMBIST RESPONSES  
What can zombists say in response to this? Is there some non-obvious 
incoherence in the description of an anti-zombie world? I can think of three 
possible lines of argument.  
 First, zombists may query the coherence of the account of phenomenal 
concepts just outlined. It is arguable that physicalists should accept the 
following two claims: (i) phenomenal concepts and microphysical concepts 
both pick out their referents directly, rather than via associated properties; (ii) it 
is not a priori knowable that phenomenal concepts and microphysical concepts 
co-refer. As I mentioned, there is a strong case for thinking that phenomenal 
concepts refer directly, and physicalists will probably maintain that 
microphysical concepts refer directly too; denying this merely opens the door 
to Russellian monism. Claim (ii) is also plausible; it does not seem possible to 
determine that phenomenal concepts co-refer with microphysical ones simply 
by reflection on the concepts themselves. (It is true that if the anti-zombie 
argument is sound, there is a non-obvious a priori argument for that 
conclusion, but in the present context it would be question-begging to rely on 
it.) But then it follows that in order to conceive of an anti-zombie world we 
have to imagine not only that two sets of directly referring concepts co-refer, 
but also that it is not a priori knowable that they do so. The objection is that 
                                                                                                                            
(MIT  Press,  2000),  and  'A  Theory of  Phenomenal  Concepts',  in  A.  O'Hear  (ed.),  Minds  and  Persons  
(Cambridge  UP,  2003), pp. 91-105. 
 13
this cannot be done coherently. For the only explanation of how we can fail to 
know that two concepts co-refer is that at least one of them refers indirectly 
and we are ignorant of empirical facts linking the properties by which its 
reference is mediated with the referent of the other concept.19 Thus if two 
concepts co-refer, then either it is a priori knowable that they do so or it is the 
case that at least one of them refers indirectly, by way of contingently 
associated properties. Following Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness, p. 92), I 
shall refer to this as the transparency thesis, since it is the thesis that if two directly 
referring concepts co-refer, then it is transparent that they do so.  
 The objection touches on a large recent literature, but this will not be 
crucial to the overall argument of this paper and I shall confine myself to two 
brief comments. First, ad hominem, the transparency thesis has a consequence 
which some dualists may find unattractive. For it entails that phenomenal 
concepts do not co-refer with any directly-referring theoretical concepts, 
including non-physical ones. This conclusion is unlikely to be welcomed by 
those dualists who hope to develop a science of consciousness which does 
more than merely tabulate psychophysical correlations (for example, one which 
seeks to explain consciousness in terms of more basic, proto-phenomenal 
properties.20 Secondly, and more importantly, if a causal or causal-cum-historical 
theory of reference holds for phenomenal concepts, then the transparency 
thesis looks very implausible. For in that case the reference of these concepts 
will depend on causal and/or historical factors to which we have no a priori 
access, and it is very hard to see how it could be a priori knowable that they co-
refer with certain other directly referring concepts.21 It might be replied that 
this is not a response that advocates of the anti-zombie argument can make, 
since the transparency thesis is entailed by the CP thesis, which they accept. 
(The thought is that if the transparency thesis were false, then there would be 
numerous exceptions to the CP thesis, since it would be conceivable, but 
impossible, that identities involving directly referring terms should not hold.) 
This point is irrelevant, however, since we are here concerned with the 
argumentative burdens of zombists, not those of their opponents. The zombist 
must show that anti-zombies are inconceivable, regardless of whether the anti-
zombie argument is sound.  
 I think this reply is in essence a good one, though it would require more 
work to establish the case. I shall not pursue the matter here, however, since 
ultimately nothing will turn on it. (I shall explain why in a moment.)  
                                                 
19  See  Chalmers,  The  Conscious  Mind,  pp.  141-2,  and  'Materialism  and  the  Metaphysics  of Modality', pp. 487-
8. See also M. Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 136-7. 
20  See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, p. 126. 
21  Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness, pp. 91-3. 
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 The second option for zombists is to insist that since zombies are ideally 
conceivable, it follows, given the CP thesis, that anti-zombies are not. 
Chalmers (in 'The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism') takes this 
line in response to the metamodal argument for physicalism outlined earlier. 
The CP thesis is a priori, he argues, and it is conceivable that the microphysical 
facts p might hold without any given phenomenal fact q; so it is a priori that p ⊃ 
q is not necessary. Hence it is not ideally conceivable that p ⊃ q is necessary. 
(He offers a similar response to Yablo's god argument, arguing that a 
necessarily existing god is not ideally conceivable.) The problem with this 
tactic, however, is that it simply pits one conceivability intuition against 
another. The advocate of the anti-zombie argument can run an exactly parallel 
argument for the view that zombies are not ideally conceivable. In the cases 
discussed by Chalmers the issue is clouded by the presence of metamodal 
claims, but these are absent in the anti-zombie case, and the argument is 
straightforward. The CP thesis is a priori, anti-zombies are conceivable, so it is a 
priori that anti-zombies are possible and that zombies are not (since the 
possibility of one is incompatible with that of the other, as I showed above). 
Hence zombies are not ideally conceivable. It might be replied that it is harder 
to conceive of anti-zombies than of zombies, and thus that the zombie 
intuition should take priority over the anti-zombie one. But as I have already 
noted, difficulty is irrelevant here, and without some independent argument for 
the inconceivability of anti-zombies, it is hard to see why the anti-zombie 
intuition should be dismissed in this way. Chalmers himself proposes that 
neither the conceivability of physicalism nor its inconceivability should be used 
as a premise in argument, but I see no reason to accept this ban. If the claim 
that zombies are conceivable is admissible as a premise, then why should the 
parallel claim about anti-zombies not be admissible too?  
 A third option for zombists would be to appeal to an a priori argument for 
the falsity of physicalism. The anti-zombie world is one in which physicalism is 
true, so if it is a priori that physicalism is false, then the description of the anti-
zombie world is incoherent. But what anti-physicalist argument are zombists to 
draw on? They cannot invoke the zombie argument itself, on pain of begging 
the question. The zombie argument is sound only if anti-zombies are not 
conceivable, so we cannot appeal to the zombie argument in order to establish 
the inconceivability of anti-zombies. Zombists must therefore appeal to an 
independent anti-physicalist argument.  
 There are problems with this move, however. First, it is not clear that there 
is an independent argument against physicalism. Arguably, all the major 
arguments trade in one way or another on the conceivability of zombies. The 
key premise in the knowledge argument, for example, is that the phenomenal 
facts cannot be deduced from the physical ones — which is to say that 
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zombies cannot be ruled out a priori, and are thus negatively conceivable. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the move would render the zombie argument 
itself redundant. If the only way of defending the zombie argument is with an 
independent argument for the same conclusion, then the zombie argument 
confers no additional plausibility on that conclusion.  
The point can be made more formally. Let i be the claim that anti-zombies are 
inconceivable, d the claim that dualism is true, p1 the conjunction of the 
premises of the zombie argument, and p2 the conjunction of the premises of 
the independent argument for dualism. p1 entails i, as I showed earlier, and I 
am supposing for the moment that the only reason we have to believe i is that 
p2 entails d and d entails i. But then p1 will be only as plausible as p2. Given that 
p2 itself entails d, this means that p1 cannot be more plausible than d 
independently is, and so does not confer any additional plausibility on d.  
 The moral is that zombists need to identify grounds for thinking that anti-
zombies are inconceivable, grounds which are (a) independent of the claim that 
zombies are conceivable, and (b) not themselves sufficient to entail the falsity 
of physicalism. It is now clear why the first response I considered, involving 
the transparency thesis, cannot save the zombie argument. For even if sound, it 
fails condition (b). The argument relies on three claims: (i) phenomenal 
concepts and microphysical concepts refer directly; (ii) it is not a priori 
knowable that phenomenal concepts and microphysical concepts co-refer; (iii) 
the transparency thesis is true. But these claims jointly entail that phenomenal 
concepts do not co-refer with microphysical ones — that is, that physicalism is 
false. So the argument does not meet condition (b) and is not available to 
zombists.  
 I suspect that a similar problem would beset any other attempt to 
demonstrate that the notion of an anti-zombie is incoherent. Even if a sound 
argument could be found, the considerations involved would independently 
entail the falsity of physicalism, making the zombie argument otiose. If this is 
right, then the zombie argument is either unsound or redundant, and the 
zombist's argumentative position is untenable.  
 
VI. ENDORSING THE ARGUMENT?  
The anti-zombie argument was conceived as a tactical device to neutralize the 
zombie argument. Its primary function is to show that the CP thesis is a two-
edged sword and should be rejected. The natural conclusion to draw is that 
both the zombie argument and the anti-zombie argument are flawed, for the 
same reason. This strategy should be congenial to type-B materialists, who 
accept that zombies are conceivable while denying that they are possible.  
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 But there is another option for the physicalist. One of the following three 
claims must be rejected: (i) the CP thesis is true; (ii) zombies are conceivable; 
(iii) anti-zombies are conceivable. And if one judges that the case for the CP 
thesis is stronger than the case for the conceivability of zombies, then one 
might decide to reject (ii) instead of (i), and endorse the anti-zombie argument. 
This line might be taken by a type-A materialist.  
 Of course, in endorsing the anti-zombie argument, one would incur a 
corresponding burden of proof. One would need to produce grounds for 
thinking that zombies are inconceivable, grounds which are (a´) independent of 
the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable, and (b´) not themselves sufficient 
to entail the falsity of dualism. The prospects for doing this may actually be 
rather better than those for establishing the same for anti-zombies. Prima facie, 
a promising option would be to develop an argument for the view that 
phenomenal properties are functional properties, perhaps representational 
ones. This would entail the impossibility of zombies, which are supposed to be 
functional but not phenomenal duplicates, without trading on the anti-zombie 
intuition itself. And since functionalism does not entail physicalism, it would 
satisfy (b´) too. A further argument would be needed to establish that the 
functional properties in question are in fact physically realized — a need which 
the anti-zombie argument might supply.  
 These are only prima facie considerations, of course, and in any case it is 
unlikely that anyone would want to employ the anti-zombie argument in the 
role suggested, since there is a much simpler inductive argument from 
functionalism to physicalism. Given that all the other functional properties we 
know of appear to be physically realized, it is reasonable to infer that 
phenomenal ones will be, too, if they are functional.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
Dualists should not be zombists. The zombie argument is an elegant and 
seductive piece of philosophical argumentation. But the idea that we can 
determine the nature of consciousness by an exercise of the imagination seems 
too good to be true, and the fact that we can construct an anti-zombie 
argument suggests that it is not true. When zombies and anti-zombies meet, 
they annihilate each other, and in so doing reveal that considerations of 
conceivability have little role to play in debates about the nature of 
consciousness.22 
 
                                                 
22  I  am  grateful  to  David  Chalmers,  Bob  Kirk  and  anonymous  referees  for  helpful comments  on  earlier  
drafts.  I  have  also  benefited  from  advice  from  Peter  Carruthers,  Tim Chappell, Derek Matravers, David 
Papineau and Carolyn Price. 
